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Introduction 
In recent years, religious movements have been increasingly challenging the 
modernist and secularist ideas formerly dominant globally as well as shaping 
the foreign policies of slates. Especially in the last decade, pro-religious political 
parties made significant electoral advances in various countries, including the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Muslin.1 Brotherhood 
in Egypt. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, ethnic and religious issues 
have become important parts of public debate and policy and were argued to be 
prominent in shaping bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria. 
Turkish-Syrian relations from the 1980s to 1998 were overshadowed by 
Syrian backing of the PKK campaign against the Turkish government. After the 
Adami Agreements of 1998 when Syria ceased support for the PKK, relations 
began to improve. With Asad's coming to power in 2000 and the AKP's new 
'zero-problems' policy toward its neighbours, relations between the two countries 
became so cordial that some claimed there was a major 'axis shift' in Turkish 
foreign policy and that Turkey was drifting away from the West by aligning with 
Syria and Iran particularly due to the lslamist roots of the AKP. Yet, after the Arab 
uprisings beginning in 2011 and the Syrian government's repression of dissidents, 
relations between Turkey and Syria greatly deteriorated. The current debate on 
Turkish foreign policy asks whether this abrltpt change is related to Turkey's 
predominantly Sunni religious identity. 
This chapter will examine the basic question: what is the effect of ethnicity 
and religion on Turkish-Syrian relations? It argues that one of the key factors 
which affects Turkish-Syrian relations is these two states' dealings with their own 
domestic ethnic and religious groups such as the Turkish government's treatment 
of the Kurdish minority and the Alawite-dominated Syrian government's treatment 
of Syria's Sunni majority, with both governments choosing at key points to use 
religion and ethnicity against each other. 
The chapter begins with a literature review where relevant studies on the issue 
are discussed. A specific focus is given to the third party intervention literature and 
ethno-religious conflicts studies since Turkish-Syrian relations are relevant to both 
areas of inquiry. This part is followed by an analysis of how the irredentist Kurdish 
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conflict in Turkey and ethno-religious conflict in Syria since 20 I I have affected 
bilateral relations. The chapter ends with a conclusion. 
Religion, Ethnicity, Foreign Policy and International Interventions 
Since this chapter l<)Cuses on how ethnicity and religious dillcrcnces af'lcct Turkey 
and Syria's foreign policies vis ,i vis each other, this review examines studies of' 
the internationalization or ethno-religious conflicts.' Such studies suggest that 
ethnic conflicts may lead to violent, ortcn unmanageable interstate conflicts 
(Carment 1994). However there is no consensus about how ethnic conflicts arc 
internationalized (James and Ozdamar 2005). More specifically,' is ethnic conflict 
internally generated, then externalized? Do ethnic conflicts weaken state structures 
and thus invite external intervention or is it a more complex interaction'>' (James 
and Ozdamar 2005) 
Cannent ( I 993) and Carment and James ( I 995) suggest that irredentist 
conflicts, rooted in ethnic strife, such as the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, tend to be 
the most violent ones and the most likely to escalate into an interstate war. Carment 
and James (200 I) present several hypotheses on the problem.2 The first is that a 
shi It in the ethnic balance or power within a state may produce ethnic strife. The 
Yugoslavian case at the beginning of 1990s supports this hypothes�s. In Syria, the 
Uprising since 2011 has produced a similar effect: Asad and his Alawite-dominated 
government have been hard pressed by the anti-regime mobilization among the 
Sunni majority community. A second hypothesis is that state structures weakened 
by such strife invite external meddling, often from a neighbouring country, which 
escalates conflicts. The Serbian case at the beginning of the 1990s and Somali case 
in late the 1970s support this hypothesis. The Syrian case, where the government 
could not provide security or control violence for over a year, costing thousands of 
lives, seems to have contributed to the Turkish government's unusual involvement 
in Syria's internal affairs. Similarly, Kaufo1ann (200 I) argues that once the state 
ceases to protect diflercnt ethnic groups in the country, each community mobilizes 
to protect their own people. This may result in intervention by other states, usually 
lo protect an ethnic group, which internationalizes the conflict. Thousands or 
Syrian refugees in Turkey may indicate the beginning of a chain of events that 
will lead to more Turkish involvement in the Syrian conflict. Similarly, Van Evera 
( 1994) suggests that ethnic conflict creates security dilemmas for both the ethnic 
groups and neighbouring states that cause spiral effects, international conflict and 
external intervention. These studies suggest ethnic strife can even cause a full-scale 
This literature review is based mostly on the authors' conference paper entitled 
'Rcli'gious Discrimination and Patterns or Foreign Policy' presented at the !SA Annual 
Con forcnce in 20 I O. 
This discussion is adopted from James and C>zdamar (2005). Sec this article ror 
more information on thi� debate. 
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war between two states. Turkish-Syrian relations since the Syrian Uprising alarms 
observers for these reasons. Reasons for intervention, according to I lernclidis 
( 1990) can vary greatly, from purely instrumental to afrective, notably those based 
on shared identity; in our case arguably both reasons are intertwined. 
Another hypothesis is that international organizations (both governmental 
and non-governmental) will serve as vehicles for external meddling by states that 
plan to intervene to help their brethren. For Heraclides, the international system 
may influence domestic conOicts in three different ways: it may encourage it, help 
isolate and suppress it, or encourage reconciliation (Heraclides 1990). Especially 
during the peak point of the PKK terrorism in the 1990s, the EU and European 
Parliament's meddling arguably encouraged the PKK insurgency. The Syrian 
conflict in 2011-2012 shows that different important actors within the international 
system may also have conflicting aims. For example, while the UN attempted 
to reach a reconciliation between conflicting parties, Russia seems to care about 
isolating the conflict and keeping its client government in power in Syria. 
Religious affinities are also found in the literature to be important determinants 
or extemal intervention and internationalization of conflicts. Religious alTinitics are 
quite influential in foreign policy decisions because, as is clear from the literature on 
identity, religion is a highly salient component of individual and collective identity, 
shaping perceptions as well as the world-views of believers (Seu! 1999, Kinnvall 
2004, Voye 1999). Ethno-religious conflicts arc known to attract third-party supporl 
more often than conflicts between ethnic groups that belong to the same religious 
tradition (Fox 200 I a, Fox et al. 2009). Religious conflicts are considered lo be more 
significant to potential inlervencrs. and those who intervene mostly have religious 
affinities (and populations that are religiously similar) with the ethnic groups on 
whose behal r they intervene ( Fox 200 I b ). Fox ( et al. 2009: 164-165) suggest that 
'religious affinities are particularly strnng COnipared to other forms of identity' and 
religious allinity could shape the decision to intervene. 
Domestic repression or religious groups may cause problems with other 
states, especially with those states that share the same religious background 
as the repressed group. This scenario is an important determinant of external 
intervention and the internationalization of conflicts. For example, as Ghose and 
James note (2005), religion played an imporlant part in Pakistan's intervention 
in Kashmir. Armed conflict between the Indian government and Muslim groups 
in Kashmir induced support for these groups from neighbouring Pakistan, a 
country with a predominantly Muslim population. Such support resulted in Indian 
foreign policy reactions, escalating inter-state tensions. This pattern is duplicated 
between Turkey and Syria. There is a connection between Syria's crackdown on 
the Sunni opposition and its deteriorating relations with Turkey, while the Turkish 
government's support for the Free Syrian Army may be connected to Turkey's 
religious atlinity with the Sunnis in Syria. 
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Ethnicity and 'I\Jrkey-Syria Relations: The Kurdish Issue 
Th is section aims to provide an overview ot'Syria-Turkey relations with an emphasis 
on the Kurdish question. The 'Kurdish question' is a never-ending problem for 
Turkey. The Kurds, mostly spread across Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, have never 
gained sovereign statehood although some believe they make up a nation. The 
first Kurdish revolts began during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and 
continued in the Republic of Turkey such as in 1925, 1930 and I 9'37-38. Central 
governments controlled these revolts by military means. With the foundation of the 
Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in 1979 and its terrorist acts beginning in the early 
1980s and subsequent escalation in the 1990s, the Kurdish issue became Turkey's 
most impor1ant security problem. Domestically, the legitimacy of the Turkish state 
was tested and military expenditures weakened the already problematic economy 
(James and Ozdamar 2009). Internationally, Turkey's foreign policy both vis-a -vis 
regional actors and superpowers such as the US and USSR (and later Russia) was 
defined by this problem. 
Turkey was determined to end aid lo the PKK from regional governments as 
well as other international actors such as the US and European governments like 
Germany. Turkish-Syrian relations were particularly negatively affected by the 
presence of PKK fighters and their leader Abdullah bcalan in the country. Over 
two decades, Turkey made many attempts to persuade the Syrian government to 
stop giving sanctuary to the PKK and its leader. In this quest, therre were several 
key episodes (Olson 2000 and 200 I; also James and Ozdamar 2009). 
The first was the negotiations in Damascus in 1987 when Turgut Ozal was 
Prime Minister of Turkey. Turkey and Syria signed a security protocol promising 
to 'obstruct groups engaged in destructive activities directed against one another 
on their own territory and ... not [to] turn a blind eye to them in any way' (Olson 
2000). Syria, as a downstream country, had put the Euphrates water issue on the 
table and Turkey also agreed to release a certain volume of Euphrates river water 
to Syria. In these meetings, Syria did not accept that bcalan was in Damascus 
and was reluctant to include this factor in negotiations. This agreement was not 
successful: Syria continued to aid the terrorist organization and Turkey continued 
to restrict the flow of the Euphrates water into Syria. 
The second negotiations came after the Gulf war of I 990. Turk,ey was keen to 
prevent a potential Kurdish state emerging as a result of a possible disintegration 
of Iraq (Altun1�1k 2004). As the PKK increased its influence and activities, worries 
increased in Turkey; meanwhile, Syria disputed the Southeast Anatolia Project 
(GAP) that established Turkey's control over the flow of the Euphrates and Tigris 
rivers (Jouejati 1996). Turkey expected the GAP project would help to curb the 
power of the PKK by increasing the prosperity of the predominantly Kurdish 
population in the southeast.J The two countries signed an agreement in 1992 in 
which they promised to collaborate against armed terrorists and Syria accepted 
See <;arkoglu and Eder (200 I a and 200 I b) for rurlhcr discussion. 
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this designation of the PKK. 1-lowevl:!r, this agreement did not drnngc Syrian 
behaviour. In return Turkey used the ·water card' against its neighbour. 
The early 1990s was the peak of'PKK allacks against Turkey since the eflects or 
the Gu! r War, such as the waning or Saddam's authority north of the 36th parallel, 
had allowed it lo improve its capabilities. In this context, other regional powers, 
induding Iran and Syria, also became wary or Kurdish ambitions and or the 
possibility ofnn independent Kurdistan that would threaten the territorial integrity 
of all four countries. To prevent the spillover eflecls of the power vacuum in 
northern Iraq allcr the Gulf War, the Turkish, Iranian and Syrian foreign ministers 
held a conlcrcnee in which they articulated their governments' opposition to an 
independent Kurdish state in the region (Olson 200 I). However. PKK fighters 
as well as the leadership continued lo use Syrian territory to altack Turkey. In a 
fourth period, we observe as early as 1994-1995 a preview of the close economic 
cooperation of the 2000s. Trade negotiations and Turkcy's altempls to use the 
economy and bilateral trade as a ·carrot' had limited success. However, Syria's 
continued support for PKK activities around the border in I lalay prevented any 
further improvement in economic or political relations (Olson 200 I ). 
The fillh period is termed by Olson (2001) Turkey's ·undeclared war' against 
Syria ( sec also Robins 1 996 ). L)amascus and Ankara chose lo strengthen their 
hand against each other by seeking regional alliances. While Syria developed its 
relations with Armenia, Greece and Iran (Mulli I 998), Turkey got closer lo Israel. 
Turkey and Israel signed a military agreement in April 1996 (Allu111�1k and Tiir 
2006). Developing Turkey-Israel cooperation sent shock waves through the Syrian 
leadership (l3engio and Ozcan 2000). As Altu111�1k and Tiir (2006: 136) point out 
'Syria and Turkey were locked in a security dilemma and resorted to alliances lo deal 
with it' and 'each alliance decision led to more insecurity on the other side.' The two 
countries fbund themselves in a major crisis in this particular strategic environment. 
In 19%, Turkey declared that it would exercise its right to respond if Syria 
did not end its support for the PKK. When Syria did not respond, Turkey froze its 
relations with the country. As Turkey mobilized its troops on the Syrian border, 
Syria responded by expelling Ocalan IJ·om Syria. On 20 October 1998, the Adana 
Accords were signed between Syria and Turkey ( /\ltu111�1k and Ttir 2006, Arns 
and Polat 2008). Under the terms of the agreement, Syria recognized the PKK as 
a terrorist organization, and agreed to end supplying weapons and support to it. 
(Aykan 1999) Syria also shut down PKK camps located in the country. In 1999, 
Ocalan was captured in Kenya, which diminished the security threat of Kurdish 
separatism to Turkey (Somer 2004). Aller Syria had stopped meddling in Turkey's 
ethnic conflict, relations began to normalize. The 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
fear or Kurdish separatism led policy-makers in the two countries to cooperate 
against the shared threat. 
Turkish-Syrian politics in the 1980s and the 1990s is an ideal case study of 
how domestic ethnic conflicts become internationalized. A series of  domestic and 
external factors shaped the course ol'Turkcy-Syria relations, although the root of 
the conllict was Turkey's domestic treatment of its own Kurdish minority. While 
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ethnic conflicts were the determining factor in this period, religious diflerenccs 
between the two countries did not prove to be defining factors at this time: Alawitc 
secularist Asad and Sunni lslamist Erdogan improved cooperation between their 
two countries to unprecedented levels. 
Sunni Islam, Turkey and the Syrian Uprising since 2011 
The Turkish government was caught unprepared by the popular upns111gs in 
Arab countries that started in early 2011. Prime Minister Erdogan was initially 
reluctant to accept NATO intervention in Libya since Turkish lirms had received 
many Libyan government contracts in the country. As Turkey's traditional allies 
in NATO became convinced intervention was necessary, the Turkish government 
changed its position and joined the NATO coalition against Qaddali. The Erdogan 
government also changed its rhetoric and took a clear position in favour of 
toppling dictators in the Middle East. In September 20 I I, Prime Minister Erdogan 
visited Egypt, Libya and Tunisia during which he strengthened Turkey's position 
on democratization and reforms in the Middle East. 
Ethnic, religious and ideological factors also contributed to the change of 
position by the Turkish government, although they were not the most important 
factors. The AKP was established by representatives of the lslamist Welfare 
Party's 'reformist wing' in 200 I .  Although the AKP has successfully positioned 
itsel r at the centre right of Turkish politics, the most influential leadership of' the 
party has been the lslamist elite from the former Welfare Party and the Virtue 
party which were overtly lslamist. Turkish political Islam is largely influenced by 
the traditional Sunni religious and political teachings as well as its 20th century 
thinkers such as Sayyd Qutb and Hasan al-Banna. Therefore as the Arab uprisings 
unfolded the lslamist elite in the AKP may have thought that more friendly and 
ideologically-kindred governments could come to power in all Arab Spring 
countries. For example, both in Tunisia and Egypt, Ennahda leader, Ghannouchi, 
and Muhammed Morsi of the Freedom and Justice Party seem ideologically close 
to the AKP and to its understanding of Islam and democracy. Although it is very 
difficult to provide hard evidence for it, one may argue that the AKP leadership 
must have calculated that the end result of the Arab uprisings would be a friendlier 
Middle East for the government in Ankara. 
Therefore, when the Syrian Uprising started, Turkey had already changed its 
position clearly against the Arab dictatorships and in favour of democratic reforms 
in Arab Spring countries. Yet, Turkey did not immediately turn its back on Asad. 
Rather, Turkey's advice for reforms, democratization and free elections as a 
solution to the crisis in Syria were formally communicated to Asad in state-to-state 
meetings during the spring and summer of 2011. Perhaps the last meeting held in 
August 2011 was the breaking point in relations between the two governments. 
In this meeting, the differences in opinion about how to deal witli the Uprising 
in Syria was apparent and President Asad's very distant treatment of Foreign 
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Minister Davutoglu was perceived as signitying the end of a decade of  cordial 
relations between Syria and Turkey. 
After this, the Turkish government took a very strong position against Asad\; 
government and openly declared that it should 'go'. The Turkish government 
also began implementing this policy by mobili,.ing the international community, 
media and public opinion as well as by allowing operations by Syrian insurgents 
in southern Turkey at the Syrian border, allegedly in cooperation with the CIA, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar (Schmitt 2012). Asad's regime, in this period, had become 
more and more ruthless and reportedly 20,000 civilians and government forces 
died in its effort to hold on to power. The peak of tensions between two countries 
appeared when a Turkish reconnaissance jet was allegedly shot down by Syrian 
air defences on 22 June 2012. 
Religion and ethno-religious ties partially explain Turkey's support for the 
rebels in Syria. It would be stretching matters too far to argue that Turkey turned 
against Asad due to sectarian reasons, as this would not be able to account for 
the cordial relations between the AKP and Asad governments from 2002 to 2011. 
Once Turkey's security concerns were met by the Syrians in the post-1998 period 
and the Syrian government's concerns about the Euphrates River was resolved, 
both governments disregarded ethnic and religious differences and cooperated in 
political, economic and security areas. However, when relations were negatively 
al'fected by material conflicts, the AKP's affective ties to Syrian opposition groups 
helped the government to organize the opposition in Syria against Asad's regime. 
The fact that the Asad regime is Alawite-dominated and most opposition groups 
include Sunni Syrians helped the AKP government to mobilize its own base and 
most of the Turkish public opinion against Syria. Many news and oflicial speeches 
referred to the sectarian nature of the conflict. In fact, the pro-government media 
used this sectarian divide against the main opposition party, the CH P ( Republican 
People s Party, centre lel't:) and its leader, Kemal K1ll9daroglu, who had criticized 
the AKP's strong stance against the Syrian regime; he was accused of sectarianism 
since Kil19daroglu himself is an Alawite·' and for ignoring the horrible atrocities 
committed by Bashar al-Asad. 
On the other hand, it seems that the dominant opinion in Dama:;cus is that the 
Turkish government turned against it for sectarian reasons. Atler the downing of 
the Turkish F4 jet, a Turkish journalist li:qm the daily Cumhuri;;conducre'a1iVei·y 
hig1;:·p,·ofi le interview W
0
ith Asad. i;) Damas�-;·,;·. -In ti,is interview),sad openly blamed 
Erdogiin fc>r'acff11g·out of sect�ii·ian motives.' He also suggested that relations with the 
Erdogan government had always been diflkult due to Erdogan's 'extreme interest' 
in the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Asad suggested that even when relations were 
at its peak, Erdogan was more interested in improving the Muslim Brotherhood's 
position in Syria than improving Turkish-Syrian relations (<;aktrozer 2012). 
Alawiles in Turkey and Syrian Alawites or Nusayris arc, however, quite dilkrenl. 
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Conclusion 
This analysis suggests ethnic and religious lies and issues arc important in 
understanding Syria-Turkey relations but also that they are secondary factors since 
in both countries successive governments have put traditional policy concerns 
such as security and economic relations at the lop or their agenda in dealing with 
each other. The 'golden period', from 2000 to 2011 demonstrated that the two 
neighbours. despite ethnic and religious di flcrences, were capable or cooperating 
in most important policy areas such as security, trade or regional governance. 
However, ethnic and religious issues may intervene in relations and may be 
utilized by governments when their material or security interests clash. During 
the 1980s and 1990s. the Syrian government gave strong support lo an ethnically 
irredentist terrorist group in Turkey - the PKK against successive Turkish 
governments, not out or ethnic arfinity or shared identity, but as a 'card' against 
Turkey's regional policies and its control of the Euphrates waters. In 2011 -2012, 
when relations were exacerbated by the Asad regime's ruthless crackdown on 
civilians in Syria, the Turkish government used the fact that most of the people 
killed by Syrian government forces were Sunnis to mobilize its hase and public 
opinion against the Syrian regime. It seems ethnic and religious divides and issues 
in both countries are used as 'practical tools' by governments against each other 
when relations fail in other policy areas such as security. 
In a region like the Middle East where ethnic and religious identities arc 
powerl'ul societal forces. the task for researchers is to identify the specific 
mechanisms that convert these identities into political mobilization and policy 
tools. Domestically, cthno-religious cleavages have;. a powerful impact in shaping 
the social bases of political parties and movements. In foreign policy, all Middle 
Eastern governments seem to be aware or the power or identity-related discourses 
in foreign policy and of how rivals can use identity issues against each other in 
their struggles for power. Including domestic identity-related variables in the 
study of fr>rcign policy seems, therefore, like a profitable strategy for analysts of 
the Middle East's international relations. 
